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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Justin Wilson was convicted, following entry of a conditional plea of guilty, of one 
count of felony DUI. Mr. Wilson asserts that the district court violated his due process 
rights and his right to compulsory process when it denied his motion for a continuance, 
and that it abused its discretion in denying his motion to exclude a late-disclosed 
witness. 
Statement of the Facts Course of Proceedings 
On June 28, 20·12, a citizen reported seeing a person whom she believed was 
intoxicated driving a white SUV. (R., pp.13-'l 5, 20.) The reporting parly followed the 
white SUV to a bar, and the police arrived shortly thereafter and arrested the man 
believed to be the driver, Justin Wilson. (R., pp.13-16.) Mr. Wilson refused to complete 
the field sobriety tests and refused to submit to a breath or blood sample. (R., pp.11, 
14.) A blood sample was taken from him at the hospital without his consent. (R., p.14.) 
The sample Mr. Wilson provided was positive for alcohol, and indicated a BAC of .203. 
(10/1/12 Tr., p.8, Ls.15-21.) 
The State charged Mr. Wilson with felony DUI. (R., pp.40-41.) After a preliminary 
hearing, the committing magistrate judge bound Mr. Wilson over to answer to the 
charge in district court. (R., pp.58-64.) The State filed an information charging 
Mr. Wilson with DUI. (R., pp.69-70.) 
Seven days before Mr. Wilson's jury trial was scheduled to start, the State 
disclosed the name of a witness it intended to call at trial. (Second Amended -
Plaintiff's Witness List, attached to the Motion to Augment filed on January 22, 2014; 
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'12/10/'12 Tr., p.14, Ls.1-3.) Four days before trial, the State finally provided a telephone 
number for the witness, but still no address or summary of her expected testimony. 
(R., p.140.) Defense counsel objected to the late disclosure and moved the district 
court to exclude the testimony. (R., pp.140-144.) At a hearing on the motion, the 
prosecutor explained that although she had been able to identify the bartender at the 
bar where Mr. Wilson was arrested as "bartender," she had not been able to identify the 
name of the "bartender" until November 30, 2012, and she was not able to provide the 
telephone number of the "bartender" until December 4, 2012. (12/10/12 Tr., p.13, L.17 -
p.14, L.9.) The State claimed that it had made reasonable efforts to locate the 
bariender, Sheila Oxner, prior to trial, but was unable to do so because of a name 
change and an employment change. (12/10/12 Tr., p.17, L.7 - p.·18, L.3.) Mr. Wilson 
moved to exclude the testimony of Ms. Oxner and another late-disclosed witness, Nurse 
Monaghan, the nurse who had drawn Mr. Wilson's blood at the hospital on the night of 
the incident. (R., pp.140-144; 12/10/12 Tr., p.15, Ls.10-12.) 
The district court held a hearing to determine whether the witnesses would be 
permitted to testify. (See 12/10/12 Tr.) During this hearing, the State presented 
evidence as to why Ms. Oxner had not been previously disclosed to the defense. 
(12/10/12 Tr., p.17, Ls.2-23.) Arrangements were made for defense counsel to 
interview Ms. Oxner during the first day of trial, at 1 :00 p.m. (12/10/12 Tr., p.32, Ls.19-
25.) Thereafter the district court denied the defense's motion to exclude Ms. Oxner 
from testifying at the trial, but noted that the State would not be permitted to call 
Ms. Oxner until defense counsel had an opportunity to interview the witness. 
(R., pp.152-153.) The district court ruled that Nurse Monaghan's testimony would be 
limited to establishing the chain of custody of the blood sample. (R., p.152.) 
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The next morning, prior to the start of the first day of trial, Mr. Wilson's counsel 
moved the district court to reconsider its decision to allow Ms. Oxner to testify and 
moved to continue the trial so that Mr. Wilson could arrange for and disclose witnesses 
to testify that Mr. Wilson did in fact drink at the bar to counter Ms. Oxner's purported 
testimony that he did not drink at the bar. (12/11/12 Motions Hearing Tr., 1 p.4, Ls.14-
20, p.6, Ls.6-25.) Although the prosecutor did not object to a continuance of the trial, 
and in fact advised that the State may request a continuance as well, the district court 
denied the motion. (12/'11/12 Motions Hearing Tr., p.11, Ls.9-11, p.14, Ls.23-25, p.18, 
Ls.13-16.) 
Mr. \Nilson entered a conditional guilty plea to the charge of felony DUI, 
preserving his right to challenge the district court's denial of his motion to exclude the 
testimony of Ms. Oxner and Nurse Monaghan and his motion to continue the trial. 
(R., pp.154-157; 12/11/12 Tr., p.4, Ls.15-20, p.'12, Ls.10-16.) The district court 
accepted Mr. Wilson's plea and ordered a substance abuse evaluation and a 
Presentence Investigation (hereinafter, PSI). (12/11/12 Tr., p.16, L.17 - p.17, L.6; 
R., pp.154-155.) On January 31, 2013, the district court imposed a unified sentence of 
five years, with two years fixed, and retained jurisdiction over Mr. Wilson for a period of 
up to 365 days. (R., pp.158-161; 1/31/13 Tr., p.38, Ls.21-24.) After a successful period 
of retained jurisdiction, the district court placed Mr. Wilson on probation for three years. 
(Judgment on Retained Jurisdiction, attached to the Motion to Augment filed on 
1 Throughout his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Wilson shall refer to the December 11, 2012, 
hearing held prior to trial, but in chambers, as the "12/11 /12 Motions Hearing Tr." in an 
attempt to avoid confusion between this transcript and the transcript of the change of 
plea which took place on the same date, but in the courtroom later that morning. 
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January 22, 2014.) In the meantime, on February ·rn, 2013, Mr. Wilson had filed a 
Notice of Appeal timely from the judgment of conviction. (R., pp.162-165.) 
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ISSUES 
1. Did the district court violate Mr. Wilson's rights to due process and compulsory 
process when it denied Mr. Wilson's motion for a continuance of the trial to allow 
additional time to interview the State's late-disclosed witnesses and to disclose 
additional defense witnesses? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion in denying Mr. Wilson's motion to 
exclude the State's late-disclosed witnesses? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
The District Court Denied Mr. Wilson's Ri.1ht To Due Process And Ri ht to Compulso y 
Process By Denying Mr. Wilson's Motion For A Continuance Of The Trial 
The district court denied Mr. Wilson's Fourteenth Amendment right to due 
process and his Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process by denying Mr. Wilson's 
motion for a continuance of the trial in that Mr. Wilson was not permitted time to secure 
the presence of witnesses that he could call in his defense. After the prosecutor late-
disclosed two witnesses, Mr. Wilson moved for a continuance so that he could arrange 
for his witnesses to be present to counter the State's witness's expected testimony. 
The district court denied the motion, which prejudiced Mr. Wilson's substantial rights, 
including the right to due process of law and his right to compulsory process. 
At a hearing in chambers the morning of trial, Mr. Wilson requested a 
continuance so that he could locate and disclose defense witnesses to counter the 
expected testimony of the prosecution's late-disclosed witness, Sheila Oxner. The 
prosecutor had represented that Ms. Oxner would testify that she did not see Mr. Wilson 
drink anything in the bar that night. This was important because Mr. Wilson's defense 
to the DUI charge was that he drank in the bar after he drove. Also important, given the 
expected testimony of Ms. Oxner, would be witnesses who could testify that Mr. Wilson 
drank when he arrived at the bar. Such testimony would be material, relevant, and 
favorable to the defense. Because of the late disclosure, defense counsel did not have 
sufficient time to locate and disclose the witnesses his client had previously identified as 
willing to testify that Mr. Wilson drank in the bar after he drove there. 
Normally the decision whether to grant a motion for a continuance rests within 
the sound discretion of the district court. State v. Tapia, 127 Idaho 249, 255-257 (1995) 
6 
(holding that the "district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Tapia's motion for 
a thirty day continuance because he did not indicate how such a continuance could be 
used to his advantage or what additional evidence he could have established 1,.vith the 
extra time"). The district court's discretion is not unfettered; it must evaluate the 
defendant's motion for a continuance by weighing the competing interests of the State 
and the defendant. State v. Ransom, 124 Idaho 703, 707 (1993). Further, the denial of 
such a motion will be disturbed on appeal only if it is shown that the tardiness of the 
disclosure so prejudiced the defendant's case preparation that the defendant was 
denied a fair trial. State v. Byington, 132 Idaho 589, 592 (1999); Tapia, 127 Idaho at 
255. In order to show prejudice, "a defendant must show there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for the late disclosure of evidence, the result of the proceedings 
would have been different." Tapia, 127 Idaho at 255. 
However, this discretion is limited in situations where a continuance may be an 
appropriate method to cure unfair prejudice. State v. Banks, 113 Idaho 54, 60 (Ct. App. 
1987). In Banks, the Idaho Court of Appeals stated that "the discretion to grant or deny 
a continuance may not be exercised in such a manner as to deprive the defendant of a 
reasonable opportunity to prepare a defense." Id. This analysis limits the district court's 
discretion when determining whether to grant or deny a motion to continue in cases 
where the defendant would be unfairly prejudiced or denied the opportunity to prepare a 
defense. 
"Under both the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution and Article I, 
Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution, no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 
property without due process of law. The state and federal constitutional provisions 
contain identical language and guarantee essentially the same rights." State v. 
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Saunders, "124 Idaho 334, 336 (1993). "Due process requires that a defendant be given 
a fair opportunity to defend against the state's accusations." State v. Harshbarger, 139 
Idaho 287, 291 (2003). "The essence of due process is the right to be heard at a 
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." State Bureau of Child Support 
Services v. Garcia, 132 Idaho 505, 510 (Ct. App. 1999). 
The Compulsory Process Clause guarantees the right of a defendant to call 
witnesses in his defense. Harshbarger, 139 Idaho at 291. The Sixth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution, in relevant part, provides, "In all criminal prosecutions, the 
accused shall enjoy the right ... to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in 
his favor .... " U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The United States Supreme Court has 
explained that the Sixth Amendment right "to offer the testimony of witnesses, and to 
compel their attendance, if necessary, is in plain terms the right to present a defense, 
the right to present the defendant's version of the facts as well as the prosecution's to 
the jury so it may decide where the truth lies." Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 
(1967). Such a right "is a fundamental element of due process of law." Id. 
The district court erred in denying Mr. Wilson's motion for a continuance of the 
trial given the circumstances of this case. Mr. Wilson orally requested a continuance on 
the morning of trial. (R., p.156; 12/11/12 Motion Hearing Tr., p.4, Ls.14-20.) In support 
of this motion Mr. Wilson's counsel informed the court that because of the late 
disclosure of Ms. Oxner, Mr. Wilson was prejudiced as he did not locate and disclose 
the witnesses who could have testified in rebuttal of Ms. Oxner's presumed testimony. 
(12/11/12 Motions Hearing Tr., p.4, Ls.21-25.) 
The original trial setting for the case was on December 4, 2012. (R., pp.4, 75.) 
The trial date had been continued once, for a week, to December 11, 2012. (R., pp.5, 
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79, 81.) Further, the prosecutor told the district court that she had no objection to a 
continuance and even commented that the State may request a continuance because 
what happened when he entered the bar was a "very pivotal issue."2 ( 12/11 /12 Motions 
Hearing Tr., p.11, Ls.9-11, p:14, Ls.21-25.) Despite the fact that a continuance would 
not have prejudiced the State, and despite the fact that the State did not object to 
continuing the trial, the district court denied Mr. Wilson's motion for a continuance 
without articulating any explanation for denying the motion. (12/11/12 Motions Hearing 
Tr., p.18, Ls.13-16.) 
The Banks standard should apply to Mr. Wilson's case because the district 
court's denial of his motion for a continuance denied Mr. Wilson a fair trial. A 
continuance wou1d have been an appropriate balance between the constitutional 
protections afforded Mr. Wilson and the public policy goal of final and timely resolution 
of cases. 
By failing to grant the motion for a continuance, the district court prevented 
discovery and testimony of exculpatory witnesses who were expected to testify that 
Mr. Wilson drank while inside the bar, which would counter Ms. Oxner's expected 
testimony. (12/11/12 Motions Hearing Tr., p.6, L.21 - p.7, L.5.) Counsel for Mr. Wilson 
explained that he did not disclose the witnesses his client told him would testify that 
Mr. Wilson did not drink anything at the bar because he was relying on the State's non-
disclosure of the identity of the bartender. (12/11/12 Motions Hearing Tr., p.6, Ls.6-17.) 
Defense counsel asserted that, "without his ability to call these witnesses in regard to 
Ms. Oxner's late-disclosed testimony, it prevents him from presenting his defense. It 
2 The prosecutor said, "I certainly appreciate the position that defense counsel is in and 
wouldn't object to a continuance." (12/11 /12 Motions Hearing Tr., p.11, Ls.9-11.) 
9 
infringes his due process rights to call his witnesses and confront the state's evidence." 
(12/11/12 Motions Hearing Tr., p.7, Ls.12-16.) The district court's denial of Mr. Wilson's 
motion to continue the trial effectively pressured Mr. Wilson to resolve the case short of 
trial, which he did as he entered a conditional guilty plea prior to the start of the trial. 
The district court did not give any consideration to the burden on the parties, failed to 
determine whether the case had been continued before, and failed even to p!ace its 
reason for denying the continuance on the record. In so doing, the district court denied 
Mr. Wilson his constitutional right to call witnesses in his defense. Mr. Wilson asserts 
the appropriate remedy is for the Court to vacate his conviction, and remand this matter 
to the district court for a new trial at which Mr. Wilson will have the opportunity to 
exercise his Sixth Amendment right to present witnesses on his behalf. 
11. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Wilson's Motion To Exclude 
The State's Late-Disclosed Witness From Testifying 
Despite finding that Ms. Oxner's testimony was clearly late-disclosed by the 
prosecution, the district court permitted her to testify, but limited her testimony to 
rebuttal only. (12/11/12 Motions Hearing Tr., p.15, Ls.11-17.) Mr. Wilson asserts that 
he was severely prejudiced by the late disclosure, as he had crafted his defense in 
reliance on the State's properly disclosed witnesses. Had Mr. Wilson known that 
Ms. Oxner would be late-disclosed and allowed to testify, he would have put on several 
witnesses to testify that he did drink alcohol while at the bar. (12/11/12 Motions Hearing 
Tr., p.6, L.6 - p.7, L.5.) Because the State was allowed to late-disclose a witness, 
Mr. Wilson's ability to mount a defense was seriously impaired and prejudiced. 
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By denying Mr. Wilson's motion to exclude the testimony of Ms. Oxner, the 
district court prevented discovery and testimony of exculpatory witnesses who were 
expected to testify that Mr. Wilson drank while inside the bar, which would counter 
Ms. Oxner's expected testimony. (12/11/12 Motions Hearing Tr., p.6, L.21 - p.7, L.5.) 
Counsel for Mr. Wilson explained that he did not disclose the witnesses his client told 
him would testify that Mr. Wilson did not drink anything at the bar because he was 
relying on the State's non-disclosure of the identity of the bartender. (12/'11/12 Motions 
Hearing Tr., p.6, Ls.6-17.) "PN]ithout his ability to call these witnesses in regard to 
Ms. Oxner's late-disclosed testimony, it prevents him from presenting his defense. It 
infringes his due process rights to call his witnesses and confront the state's evidence." 
(12/11/12 Motions Hearing Tr., p. 7, Ls.12-16.) Thus, Mr. Wilson was prejudiced in his 
right to call witnesses in his own defense by the State's late disclosure and such 
violated his right to compulsory process and due process. Thus, the district court 
should have precluded the state from offering Ms. Oxner's testimony. 
Idaho's appellate courts conduct a review of the record to determine if the finding 
of the trial court that there was a discovery violation is supported by substantial and 
competent evidence. State v. Winson, 129 Idaho 298 ( 1996). Delayed disclosure of 
evidence is not necessarily reversible error. State v. Pizzuto 119 Idaho 742, 751 (1991) 
(holding that no reversible error occurred where witness's name and statement was 
included in first discovery response and where defendant was granted a continuance to 
allow examination of evidentiary materials relating to the testimony). The question is 
whether the delay so prejudiced the defense that the defendant was prevented from 
receiving a fair trial. Id. 
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An exercise of discretion is reviewed by conducting a multi-tiered inquiry to 
determine: Cl) whether the lower court correctly perceived the issue as one of 
discretion; (2) whether the lower court acted within the boundaries of such discretion 
and consistent with any legal standards applicable to the specific choice before it; and 
(3) whether the lower court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. Id. (citing 
State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600 (1989)). In the present case, Mr. Wilson asserts 
that the district court abused its discretion when it failed to act consistently with an 
applicable legal standard, and when it failed to reach its decision by an exercise of 
reason. 
Pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule (!.C.R.) 16(c)(3), upon written request by the 
prosecution, the defense must furnish the state with a list of names and addresses of 
witnesses the defendant intends to call at trial. Id. This duty to disclose pursuant to a 
written request continues throughout the trial. I.C.R. 16(i). However, the failure to file 
and serve a written request for discovery, "shall constitute a waiver of the right to 
discovery .... " I.C.R. 16(d). 
As a remedy for a party's failure to comply with a written request for discovery, 
I.C.R. 16 allows a district court to enter an order "as it deems just in the circumstances." 
I.C.R. 16U). In extreme circumstances, this may include the exclusion of a witness' 
testimony. See, e.g., Miller 133 Idaho at 456-57. However, before a district court can 
conclude that exclusion of a witness is the proper remedy under this rule, the court must 
first "weigh the prejudice to the State against the defendant's right to a fair trial." Id. at 
457. The extent of prejudice suffered by a party due to the late disclosure of a witness 
is a factual finding subject to a substantial and competent evidence standard of review. 
See State v. Byington, 132 Idaho 589, 592-93 (1999). 
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In the present case, on July 30, 2012, defense counsel served on the prosecutor 
a request for discovery which asked for disclosure of the identities of the witnesses for 
the State. 3 (Defendant's Request for Discovery (DUI), p.5, attached to the Motion to 
Augment filed on January 22, 2014.) On September 21, 2012, the prosecutor filed its 
witness list. (Plaintiff's Witness List, attached to the Motion to Augment filed on 
January 22, 2014.) However, Ms. Oxner was not identified by name as a witness until 
November 29, 2012, and even at that late date she was identified only as "SHEILA 
OXNERD, SILVER FOX BAR." (Amended - Plaintiff's Witness List, attached to the 
Motion to Augment filed on January 22, 2014.) Her name was misspelled, no contact 
information was provided, and a summary of her expected testimony was not provided. 
(Amended - Plaintiff's Witness List, attached to the Motion to Augment filed on 
January 22, 2014.) Ms. Oxner's name was correctly identified on November 30, 2012, 
but no contact information was provided for this witness until defense counsel received 
an email from the prosecutor on December 4, 2012, seven days until trial was 
scheduled to begin. (Second Amended - Plaintiff's Witness List, attached to the Motion 
to Augment filed on January 22, 2014; 12/10/12 Tr., p.14, Ls.1-3.) However, Mr. Wilson 
had based his defense strategy on the fact that the State did not timely disclose 
Ms. Oxner as a witness at trial.4 (12/11/12 Motions Hearing Tr., p.6, L.6 - p.7, L.5.) 
3 The document requests, "a written list of the names, addresses, phone numbers 
and/or other reasonable means of contact of all persons having knowledge of relevant 
facts who may be called by the State as witnesses at the trial, together with a NCIC 
report and a Spillman report on all such witnesses, and also furnish the statements 
made by the prosecution witnesses or prospective prosecution witnesses." 
(Defendant's Request for Discovery (DUI), pp.5-6, attached to the Motion to Augment 
filed on January 22, 2014.) 
4 Appellate counsel is relying on the representations of the parties that the name "Sheila 
Oxner" was not disclosed to the defense until the filing of the November 30, 2012, 
Second Amended - Plaintiff's Witness List. Apparently, up to that time she had been 
identified only as "bartender" in discovery. (12/10/12 Tr., p.17, Ls.7-9.) 
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Had the State timely disclosed that Ms. Oxner would be testifying, and had it disclosed 
the substance of her anticipated testimony, Mr. Wilson had several witnesses who 
would have testified in rebuttal-that Mr. Wilson had been drinking at the bar after he 
drove.5 (12/11/12 Motions Hearing Tr., p.6, L.6 - p.7, L.5.) Further, even the 
prosecutor recognized that, while Ms. Oxner's testimony was vital to the State's case, 
so too was the testimony of any other individuals who may have been in ihe bar that 
evening vital to Mr. Wilson's defense. (12/11/12 Motions Hearing Tr., p.10, Ls22-25.) 
Mr. Wilson did not know what Ms. Oxner would be testifying to and was unable to 
prepare his defense witnesses accordingly. The State admitted that it had not provided 
contact inform3tion for Ms. Oxner until seven days before trial, and the defense did not 
know the substance of what she would be testifying to until the day before trial.6 
(12/10/12 Tr., p.14, Ls.2-3, p.19, Ls.1-3, p.26, Ls.12-13.) It was not reasonable for 
defense counsel to be expected to have sufficient time to contact and arrange to 
interview Ms. Oxner, and then to contact and interview the multiple defense witnesses 
necessary to rebut Ms. Oxner's anticipated testimony.7 
5 Defense counsel represented that he did not subpoena or disclose the witnesses 
identified by Mr. Wilson as able to testify that he was drinking in the bar, after he drove, 
because he believed that the district court would not allow late-disclosed witnesses to 
be called at trial. (12/11/12 Motions Hearing Tr., p.5, Ls.6-11.) After his discussion with 
his client to that effect, the prosecutor disclosed two witnesses, both of whom the district 
court refused to exclude. (12/11/12 Motions Hearing Tr., p.5, Ls.12-17.) 
6 On December 10, 2012, the prosecutor represented that Ms. Oxner would testify "that 
she was the bartender that evening. That Mr. Wilson entered the bar. That he did not 
order a drink. The [sic] he did not drink anyone else's drink while he was in there. She 
observed him the whole time and then law enforcement came in and made contact with 
him." (12/10/12 Tr., p.23, L.24 - p.24, L.5.) 
7 In fact, the district court was aware that the defense had been unable to reach 
Ms.Oxner by telephone. (12/10/12 Tr., p.14, Ls.9-14.) The defense was unable 
schedule an interview of Ms. Oxner until the day of trial-in fact, the district court had 
ordered that she be made available for the defense to interview her while on a lunch 
break during the actual trial. (12/10/12 Tr., p.32, Ls.19-25.) Although, on the morning 
of trial, the district court changed its ruling and held that Ms. Oxner could only be a 
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Thus, the defense objected to the admission of Ms. Oxner's testimony based 
upon its !ate disclosure, and further, asserted that a discovery violation had occurred. 
(See 12i10/12 Tr., p.13, L.8 - p.16, L.23.) Based upon the prosecutor's 
representations, the State was aware very early in its investigation that the bartender 
existed, but because it was not able to locate her until just before trial, failed to disclose 
her to the defense before November 29, 2012. (12/10/12 Tr., p.17, Ls.7-23.) 
Despite the late disclosure of Ms. Oxner as a witness, and the prejudice to the 
defense, the district court ultimately ruled that it would permit Ms. Oxner to testify at trial 
as a rebuttal witness. (12/11/12 Motions Hearing Tr., p.15, Ls.14-15.) The district court 
denied Mr. Wilson's motion to exclude Ms. Oxner's testimony because "there was some 
onus on the defense if their defense in this case was, in fact, he had drunk in the bar 
after driving, to maybe investigate and find corroborating evidence to that - to that fact." 
(12/11/12 Motions Hearing Tr., p.15, Ls.19-22.) The court found that because of this, 
"to not have done so allowed themselves to be put in the prejudice of the fact that the 
state came up with a witness late in the process here." (12/11/12 Motions Hearing 
Tr., p.16, Ls.3-6.) Mr. Wilson asserts that the district court erred when it allowed 
Ms. Oxner to testify in rebuttal. 
In sum, Mr. Wilson asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it 
failed to act consistently with an applicable legal standard and when it failed to reach its 
decision by an exercise of reason. The district court improperly determined that the 
State disclosed Ms. Oxner in a "reasonably diligent manner to the defense" and it was 
presenting Ms. Oxner "to foreclose a possible defense of Mr. Wilson that the drinking 
rebuttal witness, such did not alleviate the prejudice to the defense. (12/11 /12 Motions 
Hearing Tr., p.15, Ls.11-17.) 
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occurred after the driving incident" and not to prove the intoxication of Mr. Wilson. 
Cl2/10/12 Tr., p.32, Ls.2-12.) However, the district court made no determination of the 
prejudice to the defense, which was substantial where Mr. Wilson, in reliance on the 
State's witness disclosure, did not interview and timely disclose witnesses who could 
have rebutted Ms. Oxner's testimony. Thus the district court improperly determined that 
the "reasonable diligen[ceJ" of the State outweighed Mr. Wilson's right to a fair trial. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. VVilson respectfully requests that his conviction and sentence be vacated and 
that this case be remanded for a new trial. 
DATED this 10th day of December, 2014. 
SALLY<J. COOLEY 
Deputy State Appe ate Public Defender 
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